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L UJAN v. NA TIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION.
THE SUPREME COURT TIGHTENS THE
REINS ON STANDING FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
GROUPS
Federal standing confers a right to sue on those parties falling within the
doctrine's limiting provisions.' Limiting provisions include article III of the
United States Constitution, which restricts federal jurisdiction to the resolu-
tion of "[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies, ' 2 and section 702 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), which guarantees court access to those
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute.",3 Additionally, various "citizen suit" provisions of envi-
ronmental statutes allow for federal jurisdictional standing.4 Although fed-
eral standing provisions appear explicit, general dissatisfaction surrounds the
doctrine.' Until recently, environmental organizations considered standing
1. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24:1 (2d ed. 1983). Standing
determines if a party may properly seek review, and does not touch on the merits of the case.
See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968) ("When standing is placed in issue in a
case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justicable."); 5 J.
STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 50.01 (1988) (standing fo-
cuses on the right of a party to seek judicial review, and not on the merits of a case).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In the federal courts, standing may be raised at any
stage of the litigation. The doctrine is distinct from the concept of ripeness, which considers
whether the issue before the court is fit for review. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 25:1.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Courts generally read the APA broadly in construing stand-
ing. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156-57 (1970).
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, author of the majority opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), considers that interpretation to be a misreading of section 702 of
the APA. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 889 (1983).
4. Congress, through statutory citizen suit provisions, confers standing limited only by
article III constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act § 11, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g) (1988) (any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf); Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) (same); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (same). Typically, standing provisions of environ-
mental statutes limit standing for preenforcement challenges to those persons participating in
agency rulemaking. See Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988); see also 4 K. DAVIS,
supra note 1, § 244 (citizen suit provisions in environmental statutes allow "any person" or
"any citizen" who is adversely affected by agency action to challenge the action).
5. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.I (1974); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:1.
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a fairly easy requirement to satisfy.6 Standing for environmental litigants
was well established in the 1970's.7
Courts today, however, thoroughly consider standing requirements for en-
vironmental organizations.' Environmental groups now must show injury
in fact with greater specificity than the federal courts previously required.'
Current judicial restraint has altered the focus of standing requirements,1"
has led to uncertainty, and has posed new challenges for future environmen-
tal litigants.11
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,12 the United States Supreme
Court strictly enforced standing requirements for the environmental liti-
6. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 81-90. Sierra Club was the culmination of a trend among circuits recognizing aesthetic
and recreational injury as sufficient to demonstrate standing. See Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (health interest regarding DDT
sufficient to demonstrate standing to challenge the failure of the Secretary of Agriculture to
restrict DDT use); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965) (aesthetic and recreational interests affected by hydroelectric
project sufficient to demonstrate standing), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Crowther v. Sea-
borg, 312 F. Supp. 1205, 1211-18 (D. Colo. 1970) (property owners near proposed atomic blast
were persons adversely affected by action of the Atomic Energy Commission); see also Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts may require agencies to comply with the National Environ-
mental Policy Act). Justice Scalia contends that Calvert Cliffs' "began the judiciary's long love
affair with environmental litigation." Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra note 3, at 884.
7. See Data Processing 397 U.S. at 152 (1970) (holding that a plaintiff must allege "in-
jury in fact, economic or otherwise").
8. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (environmental
organization lacks standing to challenge Bureau of Land Management policy concerning Alas-
kan federal lands because the organization did not allege specific tracts of land that its mem-
bers visited or intended to visit); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332
(D.D.C. 1988) (affidavits of two organization members fail to confer standing because the
affidavits were vague, conclusory, lacked factual specificity, and did not show injury in fact),
rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.
Ct. 3177 (1990).
9. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
10. See id. at 3190-91. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that the APA
requires a controversy to be "reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual compo-
nents fleshed out, by some concrete action." Id1 at 3190. He noted that the land withdrawal
review program requires further Department of Interior action-such as granting a mining
permit-before affidavits can contest the validity of the agency's land classification. Id at
3190-91 n.3. That reasoning narrows the grounds on which environmental plaintiffs may
demonstrate standing. Justice Scalia's reasoning would require actual mining and physical use
as prerequisites to standing, as opposed to simply granting a mining permit and potential
mining.
11. See Glennon, Will the Real Conservatives Please Stand Up?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1990, at
49-50. Professor Glennon has noted that the current interpretation of rules regarding standing
to sue, mootness, and ripeness "reflects a higher degree of judicial scrutiny." That scrutiny
results from use of liberal judicial methods to reach politically conservative results. Id
12. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
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gants,' 3 greatly reducing the ease with which environmental groups satisfied
standing requirements in the past.' 4 In Lujan, the National Wildlife Federa-
tion (NWF) challenged a Department of Interior (Interior) program that
opened federal lands for mining and drilling activities. 5 NWF members
filed affidavits indicating that they used land "'in the vicinity'" of the land
opened to mining and drilling.' 6 The Lujan Court held that affidavits stat-
ing that NWF members used "unspecified portions of an immense tract of
territory"' 7 for recreation were insufficient to demonstrate standing.' 8 Fur-
ther, the Court held that the extent to which NWF could show standing
must be based upon the organization's allegations that members suffered
injury.
19
Notably, the Court also rejected four additional affidavits submitted by
the NWF, holding that Interior's "land withdrawal review program"20 was
not agency action within the meaning of the APA. 2" The Court interpreted
13. Id at 3187-89.
14. Id. at 3194. The Court held that the NWF, through the affidavits of its members,
failed to allege any specific agency action that caused injury.
15. Id at 3182-84.
16. Id at 3184.
17. Id at 3189.
18. Id The affidavits, which two members signed under oath, stated that their "'recrea-
tional use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands... have been and continue to be adversely
affected in fact by the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department.'" Id at 3187. One
affidavit claimed that the agency had opened the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyo-
ming to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatened the
aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands. Id at 3187-88. The second affi-
davit claimed substantially the same injury and use of land "'in the vicinity of Grand Canyon
National Part [sic], the Arizona Strip (Kanab Plateau), and the Kaibab National Forest.'" Id
at 3187. While the district court accepted the rationale that standing could exist for recrea-
tional purposes and aesthetic enjoyment, the district court noted that the approximately 4500
acres opened for mining were located within a two million acre area of land, "the balance of
which, with the exception of 2000 acres, has always been open to mineral leasing and mining."
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422
(D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub norm Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). The
district court concluded that the two affidavits contained only a "bare allegation of injury,"
because there was no evidence that the members' recreational use and enjoyment extended to
the particular 4500 acres of the 2 million affected by the termination. Id. at 331-32. The
Supreme Court agreed that the affidavits insufficiently alleged injury. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at
3194.
19. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89.
20. Id. at 3189.
21. Id. at 3189-93. The Court drew a parallel between the Departments of Interior and
Defense to the highlight the vagueness of the term "land withdrawal review program." The
Court explained that the term was as all-encompassing as "weapons procurement program"
and, therefore, just as vague and unidentifiable. Id at 3189; see also infra note 25 (discussing
the land withdrawal review program and its history).
19911
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the APA to require concrete controversies of manageable proportions,22 and
to require that a claimant allege facts showing a harmful or potentially
harmful situation that demonstrates the applicability of the challenged regu-
lation to the situation.23 Accordingly, the Court refused to intervene be-
cause the land withdrawal review program was not a final agency action
with "an actual or immediately threatened effect." 24
Lujan arose out of the controversy surrounding the Bureau of Land Man-
agement's (BLM) land withdrawal review program.25 As an agency within
Interior, the BLM must comply with the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (FLPMA),2 6 which retains "public lands for multiple use
management." '' Provisions of FLPMA direct the Secretary of the Interior
to inventory all public lands and their values,25 to require land use plan-
ning,29 and to subject existing classifications of public lands to review, modi-
fication, or termination.3" Pursuant to FLPMA, the BLM reclassified land
in Wyoming and Arizona in 1984, returning some of the land to the public
domain and making some of the land available for mining and other
activities.
3 1
In response, the NWF challenged the termination of protection restric-
tions and sought an injunction to prevent mining on the lands.32 The NWF
claimed that "the reclassification of some withdrawn lands and the return of
others to the public domain would open the lands up to mining activities,
22. Lujan, .10 S. Ct. at 3190.
23. Id
24. Id at 3191 (citing Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-66 (1967)).
25. Id at 3182-83. Originally, Congress allowed only the President to exempt public
lands from statutes which permitted citizens to acquire title to large tracts of federally owned
land. The President could remove federal land from the public domain and exclude public
land from statutory restrictions. Id. at 3182. For example, the Pickett Act, 43 U.S.C. § 141
(1970), repealed, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976), authorized the President to exempt lands from the Min-
ing Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22, and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, 30
U.S.C. § 181. At his discretion, the President could withdraw public lands from settlement,
location, sale, or entry. Similarly, the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 315F) gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to
classify public lands as either disposable or as retainable and manageable. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at
3182. Because of mismanagement of the land withdrawal laws, Congress repealed many of
them and enacted FLPMA in their place.
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1784 (1988).
27. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3183.
28. 43 U.S.C. § 171 1(a).
29. Id § 1712.
30. Id., § 1712(d).
31. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3182.
32. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd,
835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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thereby destroying their natural beauty."3 3 Interior sought dismissal of the
case for failure to state a claim, arguing that the NWF had failed to demon-
strate standing.34 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia denied Interior's motion and granted the NWF's motion for a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Interior from eliminating or altering any
withdrawal or reclassification of lands in the public domain. 3-
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld the lower court's order and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings. 36 Upon remand, Interior again sought dismissal of the complaint, ar-
guing that based on the affidavits of its members, the NWF lacked
standing.37 Following the district court's request for additional briefing,
38
the NWF submitted four additional affidavits to satisfy standing require-
ments.39 The district court rejected the affidavits as untimely and granted
Interior's motion for summary judgment.'
33. Lujan, 110 S.Ct. at 3183-84. The NWF claimed that the program violated three laws.
First, the organization asserted that Interior's failure to adequately develop and maintain the
lands and to consider multiple uses aside from mining the lands violated sections 202 and 302
of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(a), 1732(a), and that Interior's failure to notify the public of its
decision violated sections 102, 202, and 309 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(c)(9),
1712(0, 1739(e). Second, the group alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy
Act stemming from Interior's failure to report adequately the environmental impact of the
proposed action as required under 42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Third, the NWF argued that
Interior's action was in violation of the APA as an abuse of discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1988). Id at 3184.
34. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. at 277.
35. Id. at 277-79.
36. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1987). On petition
for rehearing, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia vacated the district court's in-
junction, but denied Interior's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Burford, 844 F.2d 889, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
37. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 329 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nor. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990).
38. Id at 328.
39. Id. at 328 n.3.
40. Id. A federal court grants summary judgment to a moving party under Rule 56 "if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Rule 56
requires a party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" to
defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986) (where elements essential to a party's case are not established, the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law). The earlier district court and circuit court
decisions passed upon a 12(b) motion. Hence, neither case controlled the district court's deci-
sion with respect to the Rule 56 motion. The district court found that the two original affida-
vits that members of NWF submitted were insufficient to demonstrate standing. Burford. 699
F. Supp. at 332.
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Reversing the district court's decision, the circuit court held that the origi-
nal affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate standing41 and that the district
court had abused its discretion in refusing to consider the additional affida-
vits.42 The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that "standing to chal-
lenge individual classification and withdrawal decisions conferred standing
to challenge all such decisions under the land withdrawal review
program.'
43
In Lujan," the United States Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the circuit
court's decision."5 The Court held that the NWF members' original affida-
vits were insufficient to demonstrate standing within the meaning of the
APA.'4 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, determined that the land
withdrawal review program was a collection of provisions that were too
broad to be interpreted as a federal agency action that adversely affects or
aggrieves a person.' 7 Justice Scalia agreed that the affidavits showed that the
NWF was arguably within the zone of interests that the APA protects'8 and
that recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment are protectable interests; how-
ever, the affidavits failed to aver a specific harm. 9 The factually flawed affi-
davits therefore prevented Justice Scalia from finding a genuine issue of fact
for trial as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).3 °
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun" l argued strongly that the affidavits
"were sufficient to establish the standing of the National Wildlife Federa-
41. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub
nom, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
42. Id at 433.
43. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3185 (1990). The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit also held that its prior finding that the NWF had standing acted as the law of
the case on remand. Burford, 878 F.2d at 433. The Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990), and denied standing, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3194 (1990).
44. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
45. Id. at 3194. The Court divided five to four. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy.
46. Id at 3187-89.
47. Id. at 3189. The APA confers standing only if a person is adversely affected or ag-
grieved. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see 49 Fed. Reg. 19,904-05 (May 10, 1984) (delineating BLM
orders regarding the land management program).
48. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. Justice Scalia conceded that the recreational and aesthetic
interests allegedly injured were interests that the APA was intended to protect and assumed
that NWF satisfied the associational standing requirements specified in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Id.; see infra note 105 (discussing
associational standing).
49. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
50. Id. Justice Scalia refused to assume that the general averments in the affidavits in-
cluded the specific facts necessary to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 3188.
51. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined the dissent. Id. at 3194 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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tion." 2 He concluded that the majority failed "to recognize... the princi-
ple that procedural rules should be construed pragmatically, so as to ensure
the just and efficient resolution of legal disputes.""
This Note examines the development of standing requirements for envi-
ronmental groups suing on behalf of their members. It first examines the
test that courts use to determine standing under article III of the Constitu-
tion and under the APA. This Note then analyzes Lujan v. National Wild-
life Federation in light of a recent wave of cases denying standing to
environmental plaintiffs and considers the reasoning of Justice Scalia's opin-
ion. This Note concludes that the Court's current trend toward judicial re-
straint will force environmental litigants to consider essential facts and
technical details to ensure that they satisfy standing requirements.
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDING
To have standing to sue in federal court, a party must satisfy a two-pro-
nged test. The first prong entails constitutional requirements, and the sec-
ond prong involves prudential considerations."' The constitutional
prerequisites are the article III requirements of injury, causation, and redres-
sability." To satisfy prudential requirements, courts determine whether the
type of interest raised is one that Congress intended to protect under an
applicable statute, even though standing may not be clearly granted on the
face of that statute.
56
Federal standing ensures that only a person who is sufficiently affected by
an action may challenge the action." The doctrine is intended to protect
52. Id. The dissent contended that the district court had abused its discretion by failing to
consider supplemental affidavits that the NWF filed.
53. Id at 3201.
54. See, Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); 4
K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:5 (although requiring constitutional and prudential requirements
to satisfy standing requirements complicates the standing issue, both are necessary).
55. 5 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, supra note 1, § 50.02-03 (standing requires
both injury in fact and that the plaintiffs arguably are within the zone of interest that the
statute at issue seeks to protect).
56. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 252 (1988). Congress may
confer standing through a statute by using citizen suit provisions permitting review. See supra
note 4. Those provisions eliminate the prudential requirements for standing, but tend to echo
the article III requirements for standing. See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (the alleged
injury must fall within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute in question).
57. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:10 (explaining that injury is the central issue in a
standing dispute); see also 5 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, supra note 1, § 50.02 (an
injury, or a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding, ensures that only true adversaries
will meet in court and may be established by a detrimental economic, conservational, aesthetic,
recreational, spiritual, or environmental interest). Additionally, standing maintains a neces-
1991]
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against improper plaintiffs."8 Arguments regarding whether and how well a
plaintiff proves injury in fact to a protected interest are central issues in
standing disputes.5 9
Until 1970, courts generally granted standing only when a plaintiff
demonstrated a personal stake in the outcome of the case.' The test for
standing, however, was unclear because courts did not follow a precise defi-
nition of standing requirements.61 Thus, the traditional, narrowly defined
standing analysis was changed. In Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp62 and Barlow v. Collins,63 both decided in 1970, the
United States Supreme Court adopted standing requirements that are still
used today. 6" Writing for the majority in both cases, Justice Douglas em-
sary separation of powers by limiting the "role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
58. 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:2.
59. Proof of standing enables a person to seek redress in court for injuries incurred as a
result of unlawful action. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:2. At the same time, standing is
a useful tool to prevent those who have not been injured from pursuing a remedy in court. See
id.
60. Courts historically have held that a "vital controversy" was necessary for standing.
Chicago & G. T. R. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892). Courts also have held that a party
"must be interested in and affected adversely by the decision." Braxton County Court v. West
Virginia, 208 U.S. 192, 197 (1908). In 1970, the Supreme Court reinterpreted and clarified
standing requirements in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970), and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
61. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring a personal stake in the outcome
as the requirement for standing); cf Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 140-41 (1951) (requiring a legal interest or legally protected right to be at stake); Perkins
v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (same). In Data Processing, the Court distin-
guished the legal interest test and the zone of interest test. The Court explained that the legal
interest test related to the merits, whereas the zone of interest test questions "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 397 U.S. at 153.
62. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (finding that data processing companies have standing to chal-
lenge federal regulations allowing banks to sell identical services because the companies would
lose profits due to the federal agency action).
63. 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (holding that tenant farmers had standing to challenge Depart-
ment of Agriculture regulations which affected the farmers' subsidy payments because the
agency action caused monetary injury).
64. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (trade association repre-
senting securities brokers had standing under the Data Processing analysis to allege that bank
discount brokerage offices were branches subject to geographical restrictions); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (an organization supporting separation of church and state was not sufficiently injured
under the Data Processing test to challenge a government transfer of surplus property to a
religious organization); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1975) (health
care organization lacked standing under Data Processing test to challenge an IRS Revenue
Ruling ending free medical care to indigents); United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (students satisfied standing require-
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phasized the Court's dissatisfaction with the traditional standing analysis.6"
For example, the Court criticized the use of the legal interest test to deter-
mine standing, and argued for an expansion of the class of people who may
protest an administrative action." Accordingly, the Court in Data Process-
ing replaced the legal injury test with a two-part "zone of interest" analy-
sis.67 Under the current standing test, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant caused the plaintiff injury in fact, economic or otherwise.68 In
addition, the plaintiff's interest must be arguably within the zone of interest
that the statute or constitutional provision in question protects. 69 In effect,
while the Court retained an injury in fact requirement, it substituted the
zone of interest test for the legal interest test used in prior decisions.70
A. The First Prong of the Standing Test: Constitutional Requirements
Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to "[c]ases" and
"[c]ontroversies. '71 Article III requires a plaintiff to satisfy three elements
in order to demonstrate standing.72 First, the plaintiff must show injury in
fact. The plaintiff must also show that the defendant's action caused, or
likely caused, the injury. Finally, the plaintiff must show that the injury is
one that the court may redress.' 3
ments of Data Processing and, thus, could challenge Interstate Commerce Commission rates
adversely affecting the recreational and aesthetic interests of the students).
65. See Data Processing 397 U.S. at 151.
66. Id at 153-54; see also Barlow, 397 U.S. at 166-67 (explaining that judicial review of
administrative action is the rule, "and nonreviewability an exception which must be
demonstrated").
67. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-54.
68. The Court found that competition by national banks would injure the data processing
services and that the Court could redress that injury. Id at 152-53; see also Barlow, 397 U.S.
at 164-65.
69. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153; Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164-65.
70. The Supreme Court demonstrated its new approach in Data Processing. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-49. In Barlow, the Court found that tenant farmers had a personal
stake in the outcome of the case and were within the zone of interests to be protected by the
statute because the Food and Drug Act of 1965 directs the Secretary of Agriculture to protect
the interests of tenant farmers. Barlow, 397 U.S. at 164-65.
71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
72. See 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24:2.
73. For a concise summary of the article III requirements for standing, see Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
471-72 (1981).
1991]
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1. Injury in Fact
The courts consistently require parties to show actual or imminent injury
from the defendant's actions.7" Additionally, courts recognize that a
threatened injury, as well as an actual injury, may satisfy standing require-
ments. For example, in Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc.,75 the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
challenging a federal monetary damage cap on a nuclear power plant disas-
ter sufficiently demonstrated standing."6 The Court decided that immediate,
adverse effects resulting from construction of a nuclear power plant, as op-
posed to a future full-scale nuclear disaster, were adequate to satisfy the in-
jury in fact prerequisite for standing.77 Immediate injury included the
thermal pollution of nearby lakes and radiation emissions resulting from
plant operations. 78 Therefore, the Court adhered to the injury in fact re-
quirement for standing, while recognizing that imminent, as well as actual,
injury satisfied the first prong of the standing test. 9
Environmental groups seized the day with the ambiguous "economic or
otherwise" wording of the Data Processing'0 decision. By 1972, in Sierra
Club v. Morton,"1 the Court recognized that injury to aesthetic and recrea-
tional interests fulfilled standing requirements.8 2 In Morton, the Sierra Club
challenged the construction of a ski resort in prime wilderness area adjacent
to Sequoia National Park in California. 3 The Sierra Club asserted standing
under section 701 of the APA, alleging "'a special interest in the conserva-
74. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3185-86 (1990); Clarke v. Se-
curities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (trade organization representing securities brokers
sufficiently injured by the Comptroller of the Currency's action to allege standing); Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (organization dedicated to separation of church and state was not in-
jured by a government grant of land to a church organization and was, therefore, denied stand-
ing); Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(environmental organization was sufficiently injured by the Fish and Wildlife Service action
expanding hunting on wildlife refuges to have standing).
75. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
76. Id. at 81. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully attacked the Price Anderson Act § 1, 42
U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988) as unconstitutional. Duke, 438 U.S. at 93-94. The Court may have
tread lightly over the standing issue to assess quickly the constitutionality of the Act. Cf
Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 478-87 (where the Court rigorously applied each
prong of the standing test to find that taxpayers failed to identify a personal injury that would
allow them to challenge government disposal of surplus property to a church-related college).
See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
77. Duke, 438 U.S. at 73.
78. Id.
79. Id at 72-74.
80. 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
81. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
82. Id at 734; see also supra note 6 (discussing Sierra Club).
83. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729.
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tion and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and
forests of the country.' ,8' The group argued that development would injure
the ecology of the area and prevent aesthetic enjoyment for future
generations."
The Supreme Court refused to formulate a special standing test for envi-
ronmental groups and denied the Sierra Club standing. Instead, the Court
held that standing to bring a suit in federal court exists only if the party
suffered or would suffer injury, whether economic or otherwise. 6 The Court
explained that an organization needs more than "injury to a cognizable in-
terest" to demonstrate standing. 7 The Court found that the Sierra Club did
not show individualized harm or concrete injury because the organization
failed to allege that the development of a ski lodge in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains would adversely affect it or its members.8 8 Therefore, while the
Court in Sierra Club broadened the scope of standing to recognize aesthetic
and recreational interests, 9 the Court reinforced the injury in fact require-
ment to limit standing to parties whose interests have been or will be af-
fected.9 Thus, as a result of Sierra Club, environmental groups must
provide evidence that they or their members have already suffered or will
directly suffer harm.
A second case, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP),9 1 decided shortly after Sierra Club, further prompted
environmental groups to seek their day in court.92 The case arose from an
84. Id. at 730.
85. Id. at 734.
86. Id. at 734, 738-39. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (conservationists had
standing to challenge hydroelectric project without showing economic injury where a direct,
personal interest that is aesthetic, recreational, and conservational is at stake).
87. Id. at 734-35. The injury alleged in Sierra Club was not factually specific enough to
demonstrate standing. See also Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th
Cir. 1971) (denying a corporation standing to protect the public interest in the San Fransisco
Bay area because the corporation did not assert infringement of any of its rights or properties
and granting standing to individual plaintiffs because they benefited personally from the fish
and wildlife which the threatened action would destroy), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
88. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-36. Id. at 735. According to the Court, the affidavits did
not state that Sierra Club members used the land in a way that the proposed action would
affect. Justice Douglas dissented, urging the Court to fashion a federal standing rule allowing
a court-appointed representative to litigate environmental issues in the name of the inanimate
object about to be despoiled. Id. at 741, 750 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 734 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 734-35.
91. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
92. SCRAP is considered "the zenith in standing law for environmental groups." Com-
ment, Standing for Environmental Groups: An Overview of Recent Developments in the D.C.
Circuit, 19 ENvTL. L. REP. 10289, 10291 (1989). The Comment notes not only the impor-
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alleged violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
which requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment concerning any major agency actions significantly affecting the envi-
ronment.9 3  In SCRAP, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
proposed a 2.5% surcharge on freight rates to produce increased revenues.94
A group of law students challenged the action, asserting that the ICC had
failed to prepare the environmental impact statement that NEPA required.9'
The students argued that the ICC unlawfully approved unreasonably high
freight rates for recycled goods, leading to a decrease in recycling and an
increase in public park litter. The students alleged aesthetic and recreational
injury. 96 The United States Supreme Court found sufficient allegations of
injury within section 702 of the APA 9' and, therefore, concluded that the
students had demonstrated standing.9" The Court distinguished Sierra
Club99 by explaining that the Sierra Club had failed to allege a specific in-
jury, while SCRAP had not.bOo The Court reaffirmed its acceptance of aes-
thetic and recreational injury to satisfy standing requirements in SCRAP,
and the Court has never formally overruled that case. 1 Subsequent deci-
tance of SCRAP for environmental organizations seeking to demonstrate standing, but also the
difficulty that now faces environmental litigants seeking their day in court.
93. National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v) (1988).
94. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 674.
95. Id at 678-79.
96. Id at 675-78.
97. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
98. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 685.
99. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
100. The SCRAP Court noted that "unlike the petitioner in Sierra Club, the environmental
groups here had alleged that their members used the forests, streams, mountains and other
resources in the Washington area and that this use was disturbed by the environmental impact
caused by nonuse of recyclable goods." SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 682; cf Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 730 (Sierra Club simply alleged "a special interest in the conservation and the
sound maintenance of the national parks" instead of a direct injury to its members.). Some
commentators argue that the Court did not strictly enforce standing requirements in SCRAP
because denying standing under the circumstances of the case "would have appeared to resolve
the merits by supposition and to abridge a litigant's day in court." Albert, supra note 5, at 490.
101. Today, environmental groups generally sue on behalf of their members. See, e.g., Lu-
jan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). Organizations generally allege injury to
recreational and aesthetic interests of their members to demonstrate standing. Additionally,
for an organization to represent its members, the group must satisfy the test in Hunt v. Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See infra note 104 (discussing
the Hunt test). An organization may also sue on its own behalf, but only if the organization
suffers actual injury. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.D.C.
1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
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sions, however, have eroded the ease with which plaintiffs like those in
SCRAP may satisfy the standing requirement.1"2
2 Causation
To satisfy constitutional standing requirements, a plaintiff must show that
the injury claimed was "fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omis-
sions."1°3 The challenged action need not directly impact the plaintiff, but a
plaintiff must "show that there is a substantial likelihood that the defend-
ant's action would result in the injury claimed."" °4 The causation require-
102. Additional cases considering recreational, aesthetic, and health interests include Hu-
mane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (environmental
group has standing to challenge the expansion of hunting in national refuges, because hunting
depletes the animal supply, thereby affecting group members' aesthetic interests); Alaska Fish
& Wildlife Fed'n and Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1987) (organi-
zation had standing to challenge migratory bird hunting in Alaska because members used the
affected resources, the decrease in migratory bird population consequently injured the mem-
bers, and preventing extinction was germane to the organization's purpose), cert denied, 485
U.S. 988 (1988); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 576-78 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (concerned citizens interested in protecting the environment had standing to challenge
permits issued to sewage treatment plants under the Sierra Club test); Committee for Auto
Responsiblity v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 997-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (environmental organization
had standing to challenge harm, actual or threatened, to health and conservational interests
stemming from the failure of the General Services Administration to prepare an environmental
impact statement), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980). Cf Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (environmental organization lacked standing to challenge BLM policy be-
cause the organization failed to show that its members used or intended to use the land in
question).
103. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977).
104. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 77-78 (1978). The
Court's causation requirement is generally an accepted requirement to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements for standing in a federal court. One aspect of the causation requirement,
however, remains unclear. In certain instances, Congress indicates within a statute the partic-
ular results that a statute is intended to produce. Courts have relied on such congressional
determinations to satisfy the causation element of standing. Yet, the degree of deference that
federal courts afford congressional determinations of causation is unclear. In Center for Auto
Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843, vacated 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988) the Center for Auto
Safety challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's formula for calculating auto fuel
efficiency. After a panel of the court unanimously granted standing, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to determine if the
Center for Auto Safety had standing. Id at 847. The court divided evenly on that question.
Id at 844. Five judges would have deferred to congressional determinations of causation. Id,
at 856. Those judges contended that the legislature intended the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201-
6422 (1988)) to create a system of penalties and credits for fuel efficiency to provide an incen-
tive for the auto industry to comply with tougher fuel efficiency guidelines to avoid paying
fines. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 850-51. The judges argued that congressional determinations
should be favored over judicial predictions, and that congressional fact-finding should be given
significant weight when assessing the impact and injury of a congressional regulatory scheme.
Id. at 863. Conversely, the Thomas dissent argued that the Center for Auto Safety failed to
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ment for standing originated in Past v. Cohen,' in which the Court
required a nexus between the plaintiff's status and "the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged."'" In Flast, taxpayers challenged the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA),' °7 arguing that
taxes earned from ESEA were used for religious education in violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment."°8 The Court found the link
between the taxpayer's status and the claim that they asserted sufficient to
demonstrate standing." 9 First, the Court determined that the taxpayers es-
tablished a link between their status as taxpayers and "the type of legislative
enactment attacked."" Next, the Court found that the taxpayers estab-
lished a nexus between their status as taxpayers and "the precise nature of
demonstrate concrete or specific injury, and asserted that the plaintiffs needed a more tangible
claim than "'[i]ts institutional interests in promoting conservation in this and other industries
are adversely affected.'" lId at 867 (quoting Opening Brief for Petitioners at 5). The Center
for Auto Safety sued as an organization representing automobile consumers, and claimed asso-
ciational standing on behalf of the consumers. Id. at 848. The test for a group seeking to
represent its members was established in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com-
mission, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977). The Hunt Court held that a voluntary membership
organization has standing if its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right, if the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purposes, and if
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual mem-
bers in the lawsuit. A group may also sue on its own behalf for injury to its activities and
functions if there is actual impact on the group. Id. at 343. For a detailed analysis of organi-
zational standing, see International Union, United Auto v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, (1986) (reaf-
firming Hunt). The Brock Court required a plausible relationship between the interests of
litigants and the statutory policies at issue. Id at 288. The Hunt analysis was again affirmed
in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988). The question as to the weight given to
congressional determinations of causation remains unresolved.
105. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
106. Id. at 102; see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1974) (plain-
tiff's generalized grievance is insufficient to demonstrate standing because there is no logical
nexus between the asserted status of the taxpayer and the claimed failure of Congress to re-
quire the President to supply a more detailed report of CIA expenditures).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 241 (1965). Historically, the Supreme Court refused standing on the basis
of taxpayer status. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Flast allowed taxpayer
standing upon finding that the taxpayer satisfied a two-part test. See infra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text. Since Flast, the requirements for taxpayer standing have been strictly
enforced. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (taxpayers lack standing due to mere generalized
interest in United States' involvement in Vietnam and their failure to establish a nexus between
their statutes as taxpayers and the constitutional infringement alleged).
108. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
109. The Flast Court distinguished Mellon, explaining that although the plaintiff in that
case established the nexus between its status as a taxpayer and the type of legislation attacked,
it failed to establish a link between its taxpayer status and the nature of the constitutional
infringement alleged. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105.
110. Id. at 102.
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the constitutional infringement alleged."'1 1 Accordingly, the taxpayers had
standing to sue because their injury as taxpayers was directly traceable to the
statute challenged.
In addition to the nexus between the injury and the challenged action, the
Court also required a prospective plaintiff to suffer immediate or threatened
injury in order to satisfy the causation prong of the standing requirement.
Further, the injury must be traceable to the party sued. In Warth v. Sel-
din, "2 a nonprofit housing corporation claimed standing to challenge the
zoning ordinance of a town as discriminatory against low and moderate-
income persons and minority groups. The Court rejected this argument, ex-
plaining that, in addition to a case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff
must show a causal relation between the practices of the defendant and the
injury to the plaintiff." 3 The Court, finding that the inability to locate low-
income housing was unrelated to the alleged zoning ordinance violations,"
4
refused to allow the plaintiff to assert the rights of unidentified members of
the class it attempted to represent." 5 Not only must a plaintiff show that
the injury by the defendant harms the plaintiff, the Court held, but the plain-
tiff also must be the person who benefits from judicial intervention." 6 The
Court concluded that, "[u]nless these petitioners can thus demonstrate the
requisite case or controversy between themselves personally and respon-
dents, 'none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class.' "117
111. Id.
112. 422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975).
113. IAL at 499-501.
114. Id. at 502.
115. Id
116. Id at 508.
117. Id. at 502 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). In Simon v. East-
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, several welfare organizations and indigent people
argued that an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Revenue Ruling caused them injury by giving
hospitals a tax incentive to end free medical care. 426 U.S. 26, 33 (1976). Relying on Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Simon Court emphasized that an actual injury is
necessary to demonstrate standing in a federal court and refused to find that the IRS action
directly injured the plaintiffs. Simon, 426 U.S. at 37-39. The Supreme Court further addressed
the causation requirement in the zoning case of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The City of Arlington Heights denied a nonprofit
developer the rezoning permit needed to build integrated, multiple family low and moderate-
income housing units. Id at 254. The developer filed suit, arguing that the denial was racially
discriminatory, and the city challenged the developer's standing to bring the suit. Id at 258-
60. The Court held that the developer demonstrated standing because the economic and non-
economic injury it suffered was a direct consequence of Arlington Heights' rezoning permit
denial. Id at 262-63. The Court found that the developer's interest was not merely an ab-
stract, generalized concern. Instead, the availability of suitable low-cost housing was a specific
project that denial of a zoning point could injure. Id at 263. Additionally, the Court found
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3. Redressability
In addition to alleging an actual injury, for a plaintiff to demonstrate
standing under the Constitution, the relief that a plaintiff requests must be
likely to remedy the alleged injury.' Requiring "actual injury redressable
by the court" ' 9 assures that a case is decided "in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action."
120
that one minority who sought low-income housing and would qualify for the housing the de-
veloper wanted to build was sufficient to demonstrate standing. Id at 264.
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752-53 (1984), the parents of black students challenged
the IRS's failure to deny tax-exempt status to private schools which discriminated on the basis
of race. The Court held that the plaintiffs showed insufficient injury to satisfy the standing
requirements of the Data Processing test because the injury was not traceable to government
action. Id at 752-53.
The Court found the the "children's diminished ability to receive an education in a racially
integrated school" to be a cognizable injury. Id at 756. The Court held, however, that the
claim was not fairly traceable to the challenged government conduct because a change in tax-
exempt status for a school would not necessarily change the school integration policies. Id at
753, 758-59. Without causation or traceability, the Allen Court warned that there would be an
abundance of suits challenging "the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their
legal obligations," instead of challenges to "specifically identifiable Governmental violations of
law." Id. at 759. The Court, therefore, denied standing because the plaintiffs requested na-
tionwide relief and failed to allege direct injury traceable to IRS actions. Id at 766. Justice
Brennan stated in dissent that "[b]y relying on generalities concerning our tripartite system of
government, the Court is able to conclude that the respondents lack standing to maintain this
action without acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged." Id. at 767
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the parents, suing on behalf of their
minor children, alleged injury sufficient to demonstrate standing. Id at 771. He found the
injury fairly traceable to the challenged governmental action reasoning that the inability of the
children "to receive an education in a racially integrated school is directly and adversely af-
fected by the tax-exempt status granted by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in their
respective school districts." Id. at 774. Additionally, Justice Brennan criticized as too narrow
the Court's interpretation of standing requirements based on the enforcement of separation of
powers. Id. at 782. He commented that the "the causation component of the Court's standing
inquiry is no more that a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying
claims." Id
118. 5 J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, supra note 1, § 50.02, at 50-20 to 50-23; see
also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
119. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976); see Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring "a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy" for the
plaintiff to have standing).
120. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (denying standing to an organization dedicated to pro-
tecting the separation of church and state because its injury did not result from an alleged
constitutional error and therefore was not redressable by the court). By avoiding debate on an
issue that it cannot redress, a court insures that the legal questions presented are resolved and
maintains separation of powers among the branches of government. Id.
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In Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that the State of California had standing to challenge
the bidding systems for offshore oil and gas exploration chosen by the De-
partment of the Interior.122 In the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act of 1953, Congress revised the bidding system and
provided that coastal states adjoining outer continental shelf leases would
receive part of the lease revenues from offshore bidding.' 23 California al-
leged that the amended bidding system was not producing a fair market re-
turn.'24 Therefore, because California had a direct financial stake in offshore
leasing, the state would suffer a direct injury as a result of the Department of
the Interior's actions.' 25 Additionally, California asserted that a fairly trace-
able causal connection existed between the injury claimed and the Depart-
ment of the Interior's challenged conduct.' 26
The government argued that the relief sought, experimental use of non-
cash bonus bidding systems to increase exploration off the California coast,
would not redress the alleged injury because the government would not be
required to use those bidding systems on leases adjacent to California.
12 7
The Court found, however, that if the Court granted the relief that the state
sought, the injury would be remedied. 2 ' The Court agreed with California's
assertion that by failing to test the noncash bonus bidding systems, the Sec-
retary of the Interior had "breached a statutory obligation to determine
through experiment which bidding system works best."' 29 The Court rea-
soned that only by experimenting with different bidding systems could the
121. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
122. Id. at 160-62. Interior is authorized to lease tracts of the Outer Continental Shelf for
oil and gas exploration pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, § 1337 (the
Act), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Congress amended the Act in 1978 due to the United States'
dependence on foreign oil and increased petroleum prices. Pub. L. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
In 1978 the bidding system for exploration rights also changed to allow a greater number of
companies to take part in exploration. Energy Action, 454 U.S. at 154. Currently, the Secre-
tary of the Interior chooses the bidding system needed to lease Outer Continental Shelf tracts
by experimenting with a group of ten authorized bidding systems. Id at 155. In Energy Ac-
tion, however, the Secretary failed to test all ten of the authorized bidding systems as required
under the Act. Id at 157. Consumer groups, government entities and private citizens alleged
that the Secretary abused his discretion in choosing bidding systems, because the chosen bid-
ding system failed to generate adequate competition as required by the Act. Id at 158.
123. Energy Action, 454 U.S. at 160.
124. Id at 161.
125. Id
126. Id.; see also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977) (denial of rezoning permit injures low-income housing developer and this denial is an
injury redressable by the court).
127. Energy Action, 454 U.S. at 161.
128. Id. at 162.
129. Id. at 161.
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Secretary of the Interior find the most profitable system. Thus, such experi-
mentation would redress the alleged financial injury.' 30 Accordingly, En-
ergy Action demonstrates that, in addition to injury and causation, a plaintiff
must show that its injury is judicially redressable.
If the relief requested will not remedy the plaintiff's injury, standing will
be denied. In Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 13' a private citizen alleged that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) improperly approved funding for a San
Francisco Bay clean water plan. 132 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit denied Gonzales standing because the injunction that
Gonzales sought against expenditures would not redress his inability to use
the polluted San Francisco Bay. 133 The Court recognized that the personal
interest at stake for Bay users was sufficient to meet the Duke test of injury
in fact, 134 and that Congress intended the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act to grant standing to a nationwide class. 1 35 Yet, the Court determined
that Congress did not intend to "confer standing to seek relief that will not
actually redress the injuries the parties have incurred." 136 In Gonzales, any
relief granted would not prevent or redress the claimed injury to the area's
waters. 137 While the Energy Action and Gonzalez holdings differ, the intent
of the court is clear: a plaintiff cannot demonstrate standing unless the relief
requested from the court will remedy the alleged injury.
B. The Second Prong of the Standing Test: Zone of Interest Test
In addition to constitutional requirements, courts impose prudential limits
on persons seeking standing. 138 Courts use prudential requirements to deny
standing when clear statutory grounds for standing do not exist. " To sat-
isfy prudential requirements for standing, a plaintiff" 'must assert his own
130. Id. at 162.
131. 688 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1982).
132. Id at 1264-65. Gonzales alleged that EPA expenditures were improper because the
agency expended some of the money for contracts unrelated to water pollution contravening
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1988). Gonzales, 688 F.
Supp. at 1265.
133. Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1267.
134. Id. at 1266-67; see supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
135. Id. at 1266.
136. Id at 1267-68.
137. Id. at 1268.
138. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Con-
gress may eliminate prudential requirements for standing and confer standing through a stat-
ute subject only to article III requirements. See supra note 4.
139. Fletcher, supra note 55, at 250-51.
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legal rights and interests,'" and not those of a third party.'" Furthermore,
the interests must be within the zone of interests that the applicable statute
or constitutional provision protects.
141
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 142 a
data processing service challenged an agency ruling that authorized national
banks to make data processing service available to other banks and custom-
ers. The Association of Data Processing Service Organizations asserted
standing under section 702 of the APA, arguing that as competitors to new
market entrants, they were "aggrieved" by the action. 143 Recognizing that
interests can include economic values, the Supreme Court determined that
the interest which the data processing service sought to protect was within
the zone of interests that the statute in question protected.'" Specifically,
the Court found that the applicable statute protected bank competitors. m45
Consequently, Data Processing established three prerequisites for standing:
1) agency action must have injured the plaintiff within the meaning of a
relevant statute; 2) the person must assert an interest that falls within a zone
of interests that the statute protects; and 3) the person must show injury in
fact.'" While the dissent in Data Processing 147 contended that the injury in
fact test should stand alone, 148 the two-pronged test requiring injury in fact
and satisfaction of the zone of interest test is instrumental to satisfying
standing. 1
49
140. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1974)).
141. Id at 474-75 (quoting Data Processing 397 U.S. at 153).
142. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For an earlier discussion of Data Processing see supra notes 60-
70 and accompanying text.
143. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 157.
144. Id at 153-54.
145. Id. at 157.
146. The court noted that "[w]here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement
of the class of people who may protest administrative action." Id. at 154. Similarly, the court
in Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (D. Minn. 1970), followed Data
Processing by construing the APA "generously and 'not grudgingly.'" Justice Scalia, who
authored Lujan, hotly contests that philosophy. See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra
note 3, at 881.
147. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Bren-
nan filed the same dissent for Data Processing and Barlow).
148. Id at 168.
149. But see Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 107 (D. Alaska, 1971) (noting the
zone of interest test's imprecision and its contrariness to the original intent of the APA); see
also, 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 24.17; Albert, supra note 5, at 495-97 (describing the cloudy
purpose complicating the zone of interest test). Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
U.S. 340 (1984), further illustrates the Supreme Court's use of the zone of interest test. In
Block, milk product consumers challenged Department of Agriculture milk subsidies to dairy
farmers and the Supreme Court denied standing. Id. at 348. The Court found that only the
milk handlers, and not milk consumers, fell within the requisite zone of interest when seeking
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In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 15 the Court eased standing
requirements somewhat by holding that the zone of interest should be read
broadly. In Clarke, a trade association demonstrated standing to challenge a
decision of the Comptroller of the Currency.151 Two national banks applied
to the Comptroller to open offices offering public discount brokerage serv-
ices, and the Comptroller granted the application.' 52 A trade association
challenged the Comptroller's decision to allow banks to provide discount
brokerage services at branch offices and outside the banks' home states.
153
The challenge was based on the National Bank Act, which limits a national
bank's business to its headquarters and home state branches.5 4 The trade
association alleged that the discount brokerage offices are branches subject to
National Bank Act geographic restrictions.'
The Court found that the trade association suffered injury. Its inquiry,
however, did not cease with that finding. The Court also asked whether the
trade association's interest was within " 'the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' ,,156 The
Court recognized that the phrase "a relevant statute" in section 702 of the
APA'5 7 should be interpreted broadly to enlarge "'the class of people who
may protest administrative action' " while at the same time excluding people
whose interests are not regulated by the statute. 5 ' The Court determined
that the purpose of the statute was to prevent banks from monopolizing
judicial review of the Secretary of Agriculture's pricing orders pursuant to the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-626 (1988). Id The Court
found that in the AMAA, Congress clearly meant to leave the enforcement of the law to the
Secretary of Agriculture, milk handlers, and milk producers to establish a successful system to
market agricultural products, and not to milk consumers. Id. at 346-48. Therefore, milk
consumers' interests did not fall within the zone of interest to be protected by the AMAA and
they had no standing to sue. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1978); supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
150. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
151. Id at 403. The trade association represented securities brokers, underwriters, and
investment bankers. Id. at 392.
152. Id. at 390-31.
153. Id at 392.
154. Id. at 391; 12 U.S.C. § 81 (1988).
155. 479 U.S. at 392-93.
156. Id. at 396 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)); see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (a
whale watch/study group is within the zone of two statutory amendments designed to guard
against animal depletion); National Audubon Soc'y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 407 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (observing and studying wild animals and birds is within the zone arguably to be pro-
tected by the Endangered Species Act).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
158. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154). In view of Con-
gress' intent to prevent bank monopolies, and the competition between the trade association's
members and the banks seeking to provide discount brokerage services, the Court found that
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"control over credit and money through unlimited branching,"1 59 and that
the trade association fell within the zone of interest.
Accordingly, the Court has recognized the zone of interest test as a neces-
sary requirement for federal standing and as a potential limit on standing.'
6
Further, case law reflects that the Court will read the zone of interest re-
quirement broadly to allow more parties to satisfy the zone of interest
test.
16 1
II. MODERN STANDING: COURTS NARROW THEIR Focus
Although organizational plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate standing in
the 1970's enjoyed broad judicial interpretation of standing requirements,
courts since have narrowed the circumstances under which organizations
may demonstrate standing. An example of the United States Supreme
Court's more stringent stance on standing requirements is Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. 162  In Valley Forge, an organization dedicated to the separation of
church and state contested a grant of surplus federal property to a church-
related group as a violation of the establishment clause of the first amend-
the trade association's interest was plausibly related to the National Bank Act and therefore
satisfied the zone of interest test. Id at 403.
159. Id
160. I. at 395.
161. The Clarke Court, considering the Data Processing decision, recognized that Congress
had not intended to grant standing to every person who suffered injury in fact by enacting
§ 702 of the APA. In Clarke, the Court pointed out that to solve that potential problem, the
Data Processing decision supplied "a gloss on the meaning of § 702," by adding to the injury in
fact requirement the zone of interest test. Id at 395-96. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit gave a shorter definition of the zone of interests test in
Humane Society of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court, citing
Clarke, determined that a plaintiff must demonstrate " 'a plausible relationship'" between its
interests and the overall policies of the statute to be within the zone of interests of the applica-
ble statute. I. at 60-61 (citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 401-03). The Hodel court found that the
Humane Society's interest in challenging expanded hunting in wildlife refuges was within the
zone of interests that the Endangered Species Act and Refuge Acts protected. I. at 60-61.
The court will look to congressional intent when considering the zone of interest test. The
court in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 861 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3157 (1989), held that a
national trade organization of firms which treat hazardous waste and manufacture equipment
to treat hazardous waste had standing to challenge an EPA regulation. The organization ar-
gued that the regulation was neither fully comprehensive nor adequately strict to comply with
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988). Id. at
272. In considering whether plaintiffs satisfied the zone of interests test, the court presumed
that Congress intended RCRA to be a comprehensive framework for EPA regulation of haz-
ardous waste. Id. at 271. Accordingly, parties were "regulated" under the zone test only if the
particular regulatory action being challenged regulated the parties. i.
162. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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ment. 63 The Court held that an interest in church-state affairs or status as a
taxpayer is not sufficient to demonstrate injury in fact and, accordingly, de-
nied standing to the organization. 4 The Court explained the denial by stat-
ing that an injury must be personal and more than an injury common to
every other citizen.' 65 Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiffs failed
to "identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the
alleged constitutional error."' 66  Although the Court reaffirmed that
noneconomic injury was a cognizable injury, it insisted that the injury al-
leged be concrete and unambiguous.'
67
Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. In Wilderness So-
ciety v. Griles, '68 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the Wilderness Society lacked standing to challenge
the exclusion of submerged lands from the total charged against Alaskan
land grants.169 To show that agency action adversely affected or aggrieved a
plaintiff within the meaning of section 702 of the APA, the court required
the Wilderness Society to show injury in fact caused by methods the BLM
used in surveying Alaska land to settle the outstanding land claims of Alaska
Natives. 170 Additionally, the organization had to show that the injury was
within the zone of interests that the Alaska Statehood Act protected. 7'' The
court recognized that threatened injury is sufficient to demonstrate standing
in two circumstances: first, where government action is taken directly
against a plaintiff; and second, where the government action acts directly
against a third party whose subsequent response will injure a plaintiff.'
7 2
The court acknowledged that the case at hand involved the latter situa-
163. Id. at 468-69. The Americans United for Separation of Church and State challenged
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-
544. Pursuant to that Act, under 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1) (1988), the Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (now the Secretary of Education) disposed of surplus government property
for educational use. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 467. When surplus land was conveyed to Valley
Forge Christian College, the organization brought suit. Id. at 467-69.
164. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486. The Americans United for Separation of Church and
State alleged an unfair and unconstitutional use of their tax dollars. Id at 476.
165. Id. at 472.
166. Id. at 485 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 486-87.
168. 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
169. Id. at 12. BLM surveyed the land pursuant to the Alaska Statehood Act. Id. at 7.
The Alaska Statehood Act granted over 100,000,000 acres of land to the state. 48 U.S.C. § 21
(1958). Additionally, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act authorizes the state to select
portions of land from areas BLM designates to settle outstanding claims of Alaska Natives. 43
U.S.C. §§ 1610-11 (1988).
170. 824 F.2d at 11. The Wilderness Society alleged that shifting the land from federal to
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tion. 17 3 The court, however, found no direct or indirect link between the
Department of the Interior's action and the alleged injury to the Wilderness
Society. 174 The Wilderness Society, the court explained, failed to show in-
jury in fact because it failed to specify the federal lands that its members
used. 1 75 Thus, the organization was unable to prove that the BLM's policy
would impact them. Therefore, the court found that the plaintiffs suffered
an insufficient threat of injury to demonstrate standing.
176
By contrast, in National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 177 another District
of Columbia Circuit case, the court granted standing to an environmental
organization. In that case, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) was
held to have standing to challenge mining regulations that relaxed general
statutory requirements for state regulators and coal mine operators. 17  Con-
gress enacted the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA) 179 to protect the environment from the effects of coal mining. s
SMCRA delegated to the Secretary of the Interior the authority to regulate
mining through a permit system establishing the effects of mining on the
land and subsequent performance standards.18 ' In response to frequent liti-
gation and a change in administration policy, 18 2 the Secretary of the Interior
revised the regulations in 1983 to provide to state regulators and coal mine
173. Id at 12.
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id As in Lujan, the Griles court required the Wilderness Society to show injury with
great specificity because a summary judgment motion was at issue. Id at 17. Two other
recent cases further illustrate that requirement. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Bur-
ford, 716 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D.D.C. 1988), the court denied standing because federal coal
mining statutes for leasing and mining coal on federal land did not actually affect the plaintiff.
The plaintiffs challenged the environmental effects of the regulations but failed to produce any
affidavits to support the allegations of their complaint. Id at 637-38. In the second case,
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, No. CV 88-197-M-CCL, slip op. at 5-6 (D. Mont. July
8, 1990), the court denied standing because the plaintiff's use of roadless area in national
forests was too remote to challenge a forest development plan.
177. 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
178. Id at 709.
179. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328
(1988)).
180. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 701. SMCRA is enforceable at the state and federal level. Id at
701. A state may begin regulation after the federal government accepts its proposed regulatory
program and after the state completes an interim period of federal regulation. Id
181. Id
182. See In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 627 F.2d. 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in-
dustrial and environmental groups challenged interim program regulations); In re Surface
Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D.D.C. 1978); In re Surface Mining Regula-
tion Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978); see also In re Permanent Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d. 514 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (rejecting a challenge to the
Secretary of the Interior's rule-making power).
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operators greater flexibility in complying with SMCRA's general provi-
sions. "3 The NWF alleged injury due to the Secretary of the Interior's "de-
letion of the regulatory minimums" from SMCRA.'1
4
To show that the organization's injury was fairly traceable to the revisions
of SCMRA, the NWF identified at least one person living in a state that the
new mining standards directly affected.' 8 5 The NWF also claimed that the
lack of information required for mining permits could cause, and had
caused, environmental degradation. 8 6 The mining industry argued that the
NWF lacked standing to challenge the regulations until the Secretary of the
Interior issued a decision unfavorable to the group.187 Rejecting that argu-
ment, the court held-that the NWF adequately demonstrated the existence of
a case or constroversy and, therefore, possessed standing to challenge the
Department of the Interior's currently operative rules."' Hodel reveals
that, while courts today strictly enforce standing, plaintiffs who clearly and
forcefully prove each facet of the standing test will enjoy federal court
jurisdiction.
III. LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,'8 9 the Court exercised its power
over the technical aspects of standing while at the same time enforcing con-
stitutional and prudential standing requirements.'" As a consequence, the
Court tightened the requirements necessary to challenge an agency action
and narrowed the circumstances in which environmental litigants may
demonstrate standing.
A. The Majority Opinion
The first part of the Lujan opinion addressed the portion of APA section
702 that permits an individual to seek judicial review of unlawful agency
183. 839 F.2d at 702.
184. Id. at 707. At a minimum, mine operators must qualify for a permit by reporting the
environmental impact of their proposed operations. Id. at 701. Additionally, performance
standards, including restoring lands following the mining operation, must be adhered to once
the work is begun. Id The revisions to regulations implementing SMCRA relaxed compli-
ance requirements for mine operators. Id at 702.
185. Id at 708.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 709.
188. Id NWF's demonstration of standing was adequate because the group challenged
"currently operative rules that require no act of administrative discretion to affect environ-
mentalist plaintiffs." Id
189. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
190. Id. at 3185-93.
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actions that adversely affect the individual.' 9 1 The NWF argued that the
Department of the Interior's opening of the lands to oil and mining leasing
sufficiently aggrieved NWF members to allow the injury to fall within the
zone of interests that the FLPMA sought to protect.'92 Specifically, in their
initial affidavits, two NWF members alleged recreational and aesthetic in-
jury because they used land "in the vicinity of" proposed mining and oil and
gas leasing.'93 The Court agreed that recreational and aesthetic interests are
types of interests that FLPMA and NEPA are designed to protect. The
Court also agreed that the" 'adverse effect' or 'aggrievement' " the affidavits
established was within the meaning of the relevant statute and, therefore,
met the zone of interest test.1 94 The Court found, however, that section 702
of the APA contains two separate requirements: first, "the person claiming
a right to sue must identify some [final] 'agency action' that affects him in
the specified fashion;"' ' and second, "the party seeking review under § 702
must show that he ... is 'adversely affected or aggrieved' by that 'action
within the meaning of a relevant statute.' ,,196 The Court looked to prior
case law to find that the agency action by the BLM affected the recreational
and aesthetic interests of NWF members.
197
After the Court acknowledged that the interests raised were within the
statute's zone of interest, the Court questioned whether, based on the affida-
vits, the interests were actually affected.' 9 ' The Court relied on the lower
court decisions in ruling that the facts found in the affidavits insufficiently
demonstrated standing.' 99 The Court noted that "some room for debate"
exists with respect to the specificity of facts required on a motion for sum-
191. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988); see Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-397
(1987).
192. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3185-86.
193. Id. at 3187.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3185-86. Section 704 of the APA subjects to judicial review agency actions
which are reviewable pursuant to statute and final agency actions. The Court found that APA
§ 704 was applicable in Lujan and, thus, held that "the 'agency action' in question must be
'final agency' action." Id
196. Id at 3186.
197. Id at 3187. The Court, citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commis-
sion, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), assumed that the recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment
were sufficiently related to the purposes of the NWF to satisfy the test for associational stand-
ing. Id
198. Id. at 3187-88.
199. Id. The Court agreed with the district court that the affidavits did not contain suffi-
cient facutal allegation to withstand a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Because the government moved for summary judg-
ment, the NWF had a greater burden to prove standing than it did in opposing a 12(b) motion
to dismiss. Because the organization failed to set forth facts showing a genuine issue for trial,
the Court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment. Id at 3194.
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mary judgment.2 ' ° Nonetheless, the Court found that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were not satisfied.2°1 The Court reasoned that Rule 56 re-
quires a court to grant summary judgment when a plaintiff fails to show that
it is adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute.2 °2 The court of appeals had acknowledged that the affida-
vits were ambiguous but, based on its reading of Rule 56, resolved the ambi-
guity in favor of NWF and assumed that the affiants actually used the land
and were, therefore, affected.2 °3 The Court in Lujan, however, rejected the
appellate court's presumptions. 2' 4 The Court indicated that although Rule
56 requires courts to resolve any factual issues in controversy in favor of the
nonmoving party, the parties must specifically aver the facts to be resolved
and the court may not presume the facts.20 Because the NWF failed to
specify the portion of the land its members used, and because the agency
action in question dealt with almost two million acres of federal land,2°' the
Court found the affidavits insufficient to support the alleged injury, and re-
fused to presume missing facts regarding the unspecified portions of the fed-
eral land at issue.207
The Court also held that the district court was correct in refusing to admit
the four additional affidavits because the affidavits could not suffice to chal-
lenge the entire land withdrawal review program.203 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia noted that the affidavits could never adequately challenge
200. Id. at 3189.
201. Id. The Court also noted the inapplicability of SCRAP, because that case considered a
12(b) motion to dismiss instead of a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Id; see supra
note 91-102 and accompanying text. Rule 56 states that "the adverse party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
202. Id at 3187; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (requiring
summary judgment against a party which failed to allege sufficient essential elements of its case
on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial).
203. Lujan, 110 S. Ct at 3188.
204. Id
205. Id at 3188-89.
206. Id at 3189.
207. Id. Because Rule 56 requires a party to allege that specific facts to support injury, the
general averments of the affidavits stating that a member "use[d] unspecified portions of an
immense tract of territory" were insufficient to demonstrate standing. Id
The Court found that recreational interests were sufficiently related to the purpose of the
NWF to allow the organization to satisfy section 702 requirements if any of its members could
satisfy those requirements.
208. Id at 3189-90. Justice Scalia, seeking to maintain separation of powers among the
branches, strictly enforced the requirement that a plaintiff suffer a distinct, individualized in-
jury which the citizenry as a whole has not suffered. See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing,
supra note 3, at 894-95.
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the land withdrawal review program because the program was not a final
agency action within the meaning of the APA and, therefore, was not ripe
for review.2"9 Further agency action that directly injured the plaintiff was
necessary before a successful challenge could occur.21°
Next, the Court reasoned that the NWF would not be able to challenge
even individual agency actions within the agency program.211 Finally, the
Court refused to remand the case for the court of appeals to decide whether
the NWF could seek review under section 702 in its own right, as opposed to
derivatively through its members.212 Agreeing with the district court, the
Supreme Court found that, even if the affidavits alleged a specific injury, the
NWF had failed to identify a final agency action as the source of these inju-
ries."' Because the NWF challenged the operations of the BLM in review-
ing the withdrawal reclassification of public lands, instead of a distinct
agency action, the Court rejected the challenge as overly broad.21 4
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun's dissent rejected the Court's interpretation of standing
requirements. 2 5 Noting the injury suffered by the NWF and the extensive
litigation preceding the case,216 the dissent argued that the Court incorrectly
had asked the organization to prove standing,21 7 instead of simply asking the
NWF to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial.218 Justice Black-
mun contended that because the affidavits were "sufficiently precise to en-
able [BLM] officials to identify the particular termination orders to which
the affiants referred,"219 the affidavits satisfied Rule 56.220 The dissent con-
209. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190. Justice Scalia pointed out that for judicial review, a contro-
versy must be narrowly proportioned and the agency action must concretely apply to the
claimant's situation. Additionally, Justice Scalia contended that even if ripe, the entire pro-
gram could not be challenged. Instead, congressional action was necessary to change the pro-
gram. Id at 3190-91. Therefore, the NWF could not simply allege general flaws in an entire
program and satisfy standing requirements.
210. Id
211. Id Justice Scalia explained further that the affidavits had alleged simply that a corpo-
ration had filed a BLM mine permit application in hopes of mining some of the reclassified
land. The permit had not yet been granted. Therefore, Justice Scalia explained, whether min-
ing and land disturbance would actually occur, and whether an injury would be suffered was
impossible to determine. Id at 3190-91, n.3.
212. Id at 3193-94.
213. Id. at 3194.
214. Id.
215. Id at 3194 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216. Id at 3194, 3197.
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ceded that the affidavits "were not models of precision,"22' but found that
the Court was denying standing on evidence sufficient to overcome a motion
for summary judgment.222
Justice Blackmun further asserted that the district court should have con-
sidered the four additional NWF affidavits.223 He pointed out that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure allow the district court "discretion in deciding
whether affidavits in opposition to a summary judgement motion may be
submitted after the hearing., 224 Justice Blackmun also emphasized that the
district court and court of appeals repeatedly held that the NWF offered
sufficient evidence of its standing. 225 He further argued that the Court
should recognize the organization's standing to ensure the "just and efficient
resolution of legal disputes., 226 Finally, the dissent argued that "agency ac-
tion" may be broadly interpreted, 227 and in this case should be interpreted in
the NWF's favor. 228 The real issue, Justice Blackmun contended, was not
the scope of the agency program,229 but whether the agency actions that
allegedly violated the law were part of the agency action in question.23°
Even though the land withdrawal review program is a collection of individ-
ual agency actions making up an entire government program, the dissent
pointed out that if the questioned government actions were illegal, the NWF
deserved the opportunity to challenge either the entire agency program or an
individual land classification within the program.231
IV. FUTURE OF THE LAW
Justice Scalia's philosophy on standing was determinative in the Lujan
outcome. His view, which the Court adopted, is that limits on standing
must be strictly enforced to confine the courts to their constitutionally as-
signed role of protecting individual rights.232 Justice Scalia concedes that
220. Id
221. Id at 3195.
222. Id
223. Id at 3196.
224. Id. at 3197.
225. Id. at 3198.
226. Id at 3201.
227. Id at 3201-02.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 3201.
230. Id
231. Id. at 3201-02.
232. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing supra note 3, at 881, 894. Justice Scalia's philosophy
hinges on the doctrine of separation of powers, and "roughly restricts courts to their tradi-
tional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the
majority, and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the
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this narrow interpretation will clearly prevent national organizations, such
as the NWF or the NAACP, which have "a keen interest in the abstract
question at issue in the case, but no 'concrete injury in fact' whatever," from
demonstrating standing.2 33 According to Justice Scalia, this approach pre-
vents the "overjudicialization of the process of self-governance" which, he
argues, has plagued the courts since the 1970's.234
In Lujan, Justice Scalia determined that the land withdrawal review pro-
gram was not a final agency action and was, therefore, unreviewable. Jus-
tice Scalia narrowed standing requirements by demanding a specific,
individualized injury. Unfortunately, groups such as the NWF cannot al-
ways show an individualized injury because the challenged action often af-
fects the population generally, and not a particular citizen specifically.
Lujan's narrow focus will inhibit environmental litigants for several rea-
sons. In addition to the increased difficulty in demonstrating standing,
which now requires affidavits to allege specific harm to particular persons
and areas, environmental litigants lacking the protection of a citizen suit
provision now must file cases contesting a specific agency action rather than
a broad agency program.23 5 Such a case-by-case approach will impair the
environmental litigant's goal of "across-the-board protection of our Nation's
wildlife., 236 Although, as the Lujan dissent notes, the affidavits in evidence
other two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself." Id at
894 (emphasis in original). See generally Marshall, "No Political Truth:" The Federalist and
Justice Scalia on the Separation of Power, 12 U. ARK. LIrTLE RocK L.J. 245 (1989-90) (com-
paring Justice Scalia's philosophy of separation of powers to that of the framers of the Consti-
tution). Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy also envisions a change in the way the Court uses
legislative history. Courts currently examine the statutory text as well as extra-statutory
materials such as committee reports, floor debates, and hearings to determine the meaning of
the statute's language. See Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REv.
277, 282 (1990); Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative
Reliability of Committee Reports, FPoor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990
DUKE L.J. 39 (1990). Today, Justice Scalia stands at the forefront of a trend which argues
that committee reports do not represent the collective understanding of Congress. Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing, supra note 3, at 898 (emphasis omitted); see Costello, supra at 60; see also
Wald, supra at 298; Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 CONG.
Q. 913, 915, 917 (1990) (because committee reports do not adequately reflect the understand-
ing of members, "judges owe deference only to language that a majority of Congress has ap-
proved and the president, by his signature, has endorsed").
233. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing, supra note 3, at 891.
234. See id at 881.
235. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190-91. The majority recognized that citizen suit provisions
"permit broad regulations to serve as the 'agency action,' and thus be the object of judicial
review directly, even before the concrete efforts normally required for APA review are felt."
Id at 3190.
236. Id at 3191.
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were not "models of precision," the affidavits adequately pointed out "a gen-
uine issue of fact as to the organization's injury." 2" The Court should not
have upheld the grant of summary judgment because there was a genuine
issue of fact to be considered and the NWF submitted evidence to support
that issue.23 In Lujan, Justice Scalia emphasized that, to demonstrate
standing, a plaintiff must assert a particularized injury caused by a final
agency action.239 The Lujan opinion may be seen as a warning to environ-
mental litigants because the case reverses the trend of broadly construing
standing requirements in favor of requiring precise, individualized harm to
demonstrate standing.
Because of the particularity of the Court's standing requirements, environ-
mental litigants must now plead and prove standing with specificity, and
show that they suffer a present injury.240 Because the Lujan decision em-
phasized the need for immediate harm resulting from a specific agency ac-
tion, 24 1 environmental litigants will be more successful in challenging
individual agency decisions than in challenging far-reaching agency actions
such as those involved in Lujan.242 Environmental groups will have trouble
237. Id at 3195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 3196.
239. Id at 3190-91 (majority opinion).
240. As the Court recently noted, the elements of standing "'must affirmatively appear in
the record.'" FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 608 (1990) (quoting Mansfield
C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
241. Lujan, I10 S. Ct. at 3190-91.
242. See Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Con-
strain the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10557, 10566 (1990). There is mixed evidence as to
whether courts are following the lead that Justice Scalia took in Lujan to narrow standing
requirements. In Conservation Law Foundation v. Reilly, 743 F. Supp. 933 (D. Mass. 1990),
environmental groups challenged the EPA's duty under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), to assess and eval-
uate all of the facilities listed on the Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket.
Evaluations were to include facilities on the National Priorities List, sites most in need of
attention, by statutory deadlines. Conservation Law Found., 743 F. Supp. at 935. The environ-
mental groups submitted affidavits alleging that their members live and recreate near specific
sites in need of evaluation, and that EPA's delay magnified the threat of injury. Id at 937.
The court held that the environmental groups had standing because the affidavits raised genu-
ine issues concerning whether members had suffered injury in fact. Id. at 938. The court
distinguished Lujan, stating that the affidavits in Conservation Law Foundation identified spe-
cific facilities and thus the affliants were "within the scope of the foreseeable risk of identifiable
harm." Id.; see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 59 U.S.L.W. 4128 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1991) (holding that there is a presumption favoring the interpretation of statutes that allow
judicial review of agency action); Public Int. Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) (environmental litigants were held to have standing to sue a
New Jersey corporation for Federal Water Pollution Control Act violations because injury to
bird-watching and recreational interests from unsightly colors and foul odors in a polluted
river was traceable to the company's nearby facility); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the alleged harm to the Sierra Club resulting from the failure of
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changing the way agencies implement congressional directives. The review
of individual decisions will lead to increased litigation and will produce con-
flicting results that will not affect the program in question. Now, if an envi-
ronmental group lacks the broad protection of a citizen suit provision, the
only way the group might successfully challenge an entire agency program is
by attacking specific actions within the program.24 3 By doing this, an envi-
ronmental group can show that, overall, the agency action violates applica-
ble environmental statutes. Another option for environmental litigants is
one with which Justice Scalia heartily agrees: encourage congressional ac-
tion. After Lujan, it is clear that the Supreme Court would prefer organiza-
tions seeking to challenge broad agency actions to request relief from
Congress, as opposed to the judiciary. 2 " Congressional action could
broaden the current definition of standing to allow for challenges to the type
of broad agency action for which standing was denied in Lujan.
V. CONCLUSION
Standing determines who is entitled to a day in court and protects against
improper plaintiffs. Using standing law for other purposes only results in
confusion. Therefore, constitutional and prudential requirements are neces-
sary to properly limit the court in our democratic society.
Environmental litigants today must sufficiently allege injury in fact to
demonstrate standing. In addition to a directly traceable injury that is at-
tributable to the defendant, the plaintiff must show-through a constitu-
tional provision, statute, or common law principle-that a legal interest
exists which the group may protect. Meeting these requirements protects
the complex constitutional structure of separation of powers, because the
judiciary accepts claims only where the claimant suffers a cognizable injury.
In respecting the separation of powers, standing becomes a crucial element
by which the courts determine which citizens enjoy federal court jurisdic-
tion. Because so many environmental organizations challenge broad agency
the Forest Service to claim wildernesss water rights was too remote and speculative for
review).
243. See generally Sheldon, supra note 242, at 10,566 (urging environmental organizations
to challenge "individual actions based on individual injuries" to demonstrate that an agency is
not complying with the law). As this Note went to press, the United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3769 (1991). In Defenders, the Court will specifically address the
issue of whether Defenders has standing to challenge an agency regulation even though De-
fenders has not challenged a specific action by the agency that issued the regulation. The
resolution of the Defenders case by the Supreme Court will affect the ability of environmental
plaintiffs, and indeed all citizens, to challenge federal regulations and programs.
244. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190-91.
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actions that have widespread impacts, it will be harder for these groups to
successfully allege the particular harm that the Court requires to demon-
strate standing. Environmental litigants now must allege a direct relation
between the present injury suffered because of the use of the land, and the
agency action in question. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation affects en-
vironmental litigants not only by reassessing the importance of accepted
standing requirements, but also by stressing the need for technically correct
information in each of their cases in order to enjoy federal court jurisdiction.
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